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CONTRACT LAW, DEFAULT RULES, AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PROMISING.
Richard Craswell*

Among the topics addressed by moral philosophy is the obligation
to keep one's promises. To many philosophers, there is something
strange (or, at least, something calling for explanatie1n) in the idea that
moral obligations can be created simply by an individual's saying so yet this is what seems to happen when a person makes a promise.
Consequently, there is by now a large body of literature attempting to
identify the exact source and nature of this moral obligation.
Contract law, too, has something to do with promises, so philosophers oflaw (and philosophically minded lawyers) often draw on philosophical theories about promising when writing about contract law.
For example, a recent book by Charles Fried purports "to show how a
complex legal institution, contract, can be traced to and is determined
by a small number of basic moral principles .... " 1 In Fried's view, a
recognition of the proper philosophical basis of contract law leads to
conclusions profoundly different from those that would result from
any attempt to rest contract law on other social policies, such as economic efficiency or the redistribution of wealth. 2
My thesis is that such claims on behalf of philosophical theories of
promising are greatly exaggerated. .In particular, analyses such as
Fried's have little or no relevance to those parts of contract law that
govern the proper remedies for breach, the conditions under which the
promiser is excused from her duty to perform, or the additional obligations (such as implied warranties) imputed to the promiser as an
implicit part of her promise. These doctrines, which serve. to define
the exact scope of contractual obligations, are often referred to as

* Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.A. 1974, Michigan State University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. - Ed. I have benefited from comments by Scott Altman,
Ian Ayres, Randy E. Barnett, Richard A. Epstein, John Finnis, John Gardner, Ronald R. Garet,
Catharine W. Hantzis, Michael S. Moore, Joseph Raz, Alan Schwartz, W. David Slawson, Christopher D. Stone, and participants in workshops at USC and at Oxford University. I am also
grateful for financial support from the USC Law Center Summer Research Fund and the USCOxford Legal Theory Institute.
1. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981),
at the first (unnumbered) page of the preface. See also Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the
Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223 (1984) (applauding
what he sees as the growing recognition of the importance of normative philosophy to contract
law and to legal scholarship generally).
2. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 4-6, 74-85, 103-11.
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"background rules" or "default rules," although the term "default
rules" more commonly refers only to those rules which the parties are
free to vary by appropriate language in their contract. 3 As not all
contract rules can be varied in this way, I will use the term "background rules" to refer to both waivable and nonwaivable rules.
I am not asserting here that philosophical theories about promising
can have no implications for any part of contract law. Such theories
may well have implications for questions about the proper scope of
freedom of contract - that is, questions about whether any given rule
ought to be merely a default rule, or whether it ought to be mandatory
for all parties. In addition, certain philosophical theories may have
implications for the proper content of contract law's background rules.
For example, theories that justify the enforceability of promises on
grounds of economic efficiency, or on the special value of certain kinds
of relationships, may imply that the law should adopt those background rules that are most efficient or that best promote the most
highly valued kinds of relationships.
Other philosophical theories, however - including the one en- .
dorsed by Fried - have no such implications for the content of the
law's background rules. These theories ground the enforceability of
promises on considerations of individual freedom and autonomy, or
on the principle of fidelity to one's prior statements or commitments.
In a nutshell, the fidelity principle is consistent with any set of background rules because those rules merely fill out the details of what it is
a person has to remain faithful to, or what a person's prior commitment is deemed to be. Thus, while fidelity may dictate that a promisor
must live up to the obligations described by any set of background
rules the law has adopted, it cannot guide the legal system in deciding
which background rules to adopt in the first place. The principle of
individual freedom is equally unhelpful, for it implies only that individuals should be left free to change whatever default rule the law
adopts as a starting point. Once again, some other value must be invoked to explain why one starting point ought to be picked by the law
in preference to another.
If I am right, this means that it is not enough to reject notions such
as economic efficiency, or theories that value certain kinds of relationships more highly than others, as insufficient or incorrect justifications
for the basic proposition that promises ought to be enforced. Even if
3. The role of "default rules" is discussed at more length in Goetz & Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985), and Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: A11
Eco11omic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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those theories are rejected at this most basic level, further argriment is
needed to explain why they are inadmissible bases for selecting the
law's background rules or starting points, and, if so, to explain what
other values ought to be used instead. Unfortunately, current writings
bringing philosophical analysis to bear on contract law have focused
almost entirely on the more basic question of why promises ought to
be enforced at all, and have tended to overlook this second level of
analysis. This frequently leads to careless or ad hoc statements concerning the proper content of contract law's background rules.
Part I of this article presents a more detailed survey of recent philosophical writings about promises, for the benefit of legal readers who
may be unfamiliar with that literature. Part II then discusses the role
of background rules in contract law, and shows why the content of
those rules cannot be derived from philosophical theories based on individual liberty, or on ideals such as fidelity or truthfulness. Finally,
Part III examines the writings of Charles Fried and Randy Barnett to
illustrate the consequences of attempting to apply philosophy to contract law without addressing these problems. These two authors have
supplied the most comprehensive attempts to give contract law a philosophical grounding, yet each falls into exactly this error.
I.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES ABOUT PROMISING

Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of questions that can be
asked about the ethics of promising. One category consists of questions that might be asked by someone wondering whether to make a
promise - for example, "Should I promise to donate money to the
poor?" or "Should I promise to help a friend, if I can do so at little
inconvenience to myself!" The other consists of questions facing
someone who has already made a promise - for example, "Should I
carry out my promise, even though my circumstances or my desires
have changed?" The first class of questions asks what kinds of
promises ought to be made, while the second asks what follows from
having made a promise.
The first class of questions has received little attent!on in philosophical writings about promising as such. This should not be surprising, for the ethical theories most relevant to questions about what kind
of promises to make will usually be theories with implications far beyond the topic of promising. If a person is wondering whether to
promise money to the poor, the· most interesting question (from the
standpoint of ethics) is whether she ought to help the poor at all. The
subsidiary question of whether she ought to help them by promising
money, rather than giving them money without ever having first
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promised to do so, seems much less important. Thus, ethical theories
about what kind of promises to make usually derive from theories
about the particular subject matter of the promise (helping the poor,
etc.). They do not derive from theories about promising as such.
The same could be true of the second class of questions, concerning the ethical consequences of having made a promise. That is, there
would be nothing illogical in believing that the conditions under which
it is excusable to break a promise to the poor have no connection (in
the sense of being linked by any common theory) with the conditions
under which it is excusable to break a business promise, or a promise
to a friend. If that were the case, there would be no point in asking
questions about the nature of the commitment represented by
promises in general. One could speak of the commitment represented
by charitable promises, or business promises, but it would be useless to
search for any general, unifying theory of promises.
Most people, though, would reject the idea that the obligations imposed by different kinds of promises have nothing in common. The
mere fact that we classify certain speech acts as "promises''. strongly
suggests that they have something in common; otherwise, there would
be no point to that classification. Indeed, there is a growing body of
philosophical literature which attempts to describe the obligation
someone accepts when she promises to do some action¢, regardless of
how ¢ is filled in. That literature presupposes that there are at least
some things that can be said about promises without discussing the
specific subject matter of the promise.
Contract law, too, is traditionally concerned with the elements that
all promises have in common, so it is this literature that is most often
invoked by legal scholars in search of a philosophical grounding for
contract law. The remainder of this Part describes this literature in
more· detail. One branch of the literature takes it as given that
promises are morally binding and attempts to describe the exact way
in which this "bindingness" should constrain the promisor's subsequent conduct. Another branch attempts to articulate the reasons
why promises might be morally binding. While these two inquiries are
related at many points, it will be convenient to discuss them
separately.
A.

What Does It Mean To Be Bound by a Promise?

Assume that a person has promised to do some action ¢. Most
people would agree that this does not place the promisor under an
absolute duty to do ¢ - for example, if¢ becomes impossible for reasons beyond the promisor's control, she may be excused from her obli-
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gation. 4 Most people would also agree that the promisor's freedom
has been constrained in some way, so she cannot decide whether or
not to do ¢ with the same freedom she would have had if she had not
made the promise. If asked to articulate the exact way in which her
freedom is constrained, however, most people would have a great deal
of difficulty.
Philosophers have taken two somewhat different approaches to articulating the way in which a promise constrains the promisor. One
approach views the promise as creating additional reasons in favor of
doing ¢; the other views the promise as barring the promisor from
considering certain reasons that might otherwise argue against doing
¢. Each of these will be discussed below.
1. Promises as Excluding Reasons for Action
One view of the way that promises constrain a promisor's subsequent deliberations can be found in a 1955 article by John Rawls. 5
Rawls was only indirectly concerned with promises, as his main objective was to describe the distinction between justifying a social practice
and justifying an individual action within such a practice. But because
Rawls found the practice of promising to be a useful example, much of
what he said is relevant here.
Rawls' point was that some practices, including promising, are defined so as to make certain arguments no longer available to those
acting within the practice. More specifically, once a person has promised to do something, it is no longer open to that person to decide not
to perform on the ground that, all things considered, nonperformance
seems preferable to performance. 6 While such a preference might be a
perfectly proper ground on which to refuse to make a promise in the
first place, the rules of promising foreclose such an argument once the
promise has been· made.
Rawls recognized that this did not mean that a promisor was
obliged to carry out her promise regardless of the circumstances:
Is this to say that in particular cases one cannot deliberate whether or
not to keep one's promise? Of course not. But to do so is to deliberate
whether the various excuses, ex".eptions and defenses, which are understood by, and which constitute an important part of, the practice, apply
to one's own case. Various defenses for not keeping one's promise are
allowed, but among them there isn't the one that, on general utilitarian
grounds, the promisor (truly) thought his action best on the whole, even
4.
and a
5.
6.

For convenience in the use of pronouns, all my examples will assume a female promisor
male promisee.
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. R.Ev. 3 (1955).
Id. at 16-17.

494

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:489

though there may be the defense that the consequences of keeping one's
promise would have been extremely severe. 7

Rawls argued that the practice of promising must rule out an excuse
based on a general balance of considerations - otherwise, the point of
having the practice would be lost.
More recently, Joseph Raz has developed a similar theory in which
promises supply what he calls "exclusionary reasons." 8 According to
Raz, a promise to do¢ constrains the promisor's options by preventing
her from giving any weight to certain arguments that might be relevant if she had not promised. In other words, promises are not themselves reasons for doing ¢, but they bar or exclude certain factors
which might otherwise be reasons not to do ¢.
Like Rawls, Raz recognizes that promises do not exclude all other
considerations, thereby leaving the promisor under an absolute obliga. tion to do ¢. If¢ would involve actions that were themselves immoral,
for example, it might still be permissible for the promisor to choose
not to do ¢. 9 Indeed, Raz does not attempt to list the precise reasons
that are excluded by a promise - though he would at least agree with
Rawls that the reason, "all things considered, it seems best not to¢" is
one of the excluded reasons. 10 A promise binds a promisor, in Raz's
view, by excluding such arguments from the promisor's subsequent
calculations.
2. Promises as New Reasons for Action
A different class of theories holds that a promise creates new reasons to perform the promised action, which must then be added to any
pre-existing balance of reasons for and against the action. For example, a promise may give rise to expectations in the promisee, and the
fact that nonperformance would disappoint those expectations may
count as a reason favoring performance. 11 If the promisee has relied
on the promise in any way, so that nonperformance would leave him
worse off than if the promise had never been made, this might provide
7. Id. (footnote omitted).
8. See especially Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAw, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 210, 222
(P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). For more general discussions of the concept of "exclusionary
reasons" (or "pre·emptive reasons," as he refers to them in his later work), see J. RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 42-69 (1986); J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS ch. 1 (1975);
Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103 (1981).
9. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 21 I.
10. Id. at 222-23.
I I. For examples of this theory, see Arda!, And That's a Promise, 18 PHIL. Q. 225, 233-37
(1968); Narveson, Promising, Expecting, and Utility, 1 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 207, 213-20 (1971).
See also Downie, Three Accounts of Promising, 35 PHIL. Q. 259, 263-64 (1985) (attributing this
argument to Adam Smith).
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an even stronger reason in favor of performing the promise. 12
As in the case of the theories discussed in the preceding subsection,
these theories do not imply that a promisor must always carry out the
promise. While the fact that the promisee would be disappointed may
be a reason in favor of doing ¢, nothing in this theory rules out the
possibility of there being other, stronger reasons against ¢. If ¢ is an
immoral action, or has become impossible, the reasons against doing ¢
might well outweigh the reasons in favor of doing ¢. Thus, both sets
of theories are consistent with the belief that a promise is not binding
in all circumstances.
Similarly, both sets of theories are consistent with the belief that a
promise somehow militates in favor of performance, in the sense of
requiring the promisor to choose ¢ in at least some cases where, absent
the promise, she would otherwise have chosen not to do so. The first
set of theories explains such cases by saying that the promise excludes
certain reasons that might otherwise have counseled against doing ¢,
so the promise will have a decisive effect in any case where those excluded reasons would otherwise have been dispositive. The second set
explains the promisor's decision by saying that all the old reasons for
and against ¢ remain relevant, but the promise creates new reasons in
favor of¢. On this view, the promise will make a difference whenever
the balance of old reasons would have counseled against ¢, but the
addition of the new reasons is enough to tip that balance in favor of¢.
Finally, neither of these theories attempts to explain why a promisor is morally bound to limit her subsequent behavior in the way postulated by the theory. Instead, the goal of these theories is simply to
illuminate the ordinary understanding of what it means to be under a
promissory obligation, by explaining precisely what it is that a promisor is thought to be bound to do. The question of whether (or why)
anyone is morally obliged to follow that ordinary understanding is a
separate question which requires a separate analysis. Accordingly, the
following section surveys some recent philosophical theories addressed
to the question of why the rules of promising are or ought to be morally binding.
B.

Why Should Anyone Obey the Rules of Promising?

The question of why the rules of promising are morally binding is
easily confused with the question addressed in the preceding section,
12. Theorists who focus on the promisee's reliance, rather than the bare expectation of performance, include MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 ARISTOTELIAN SocY. 59, 62-63 (Supp. Vol. 1972), and Hanfling, Promises, Games and Institutions, 75
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOCY. 13, 15-18 (1975).
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concerning exactly what it is that the rules of promising require. Some
of this confusion was unintentionally introduced by a 1964 article by
John Searle, provocatively entitled How to Derive "Ought" from
''Is. " 13 Searle's point was that certain kinds of descriptive assertions,
or "is" statements, are statements describing "institutional facts." For
example, the statement that someone has hit a home run - as distinct
from the statement that someone has hit a round object over a fence
with a piece of wood - makes sense only within the institutional
framework created by the rules of baseball. 14 Similarly (in Searle's
view), the statement that someone has made a promise makes sense
only within the framework created by the rules of promising. Thus, to
say that a person has promised is to describe that person with reference to the rules of promising, and those rules include the normative
or "ought" statement that people who promise are bound to act differently in some way as a result of their promise. 15 In this sense, Searle
argued, it is possible to move from certain kinds of "is" statements to
certain kinds of "oughts."
A number of writers responded by pointing out that this argument,
standing alone, does not really show that anyone who promises ought
therefore to accept the rules of the practice of promising, or ought to
regard those rules as morally binding. 16 As Searle later clarified, the
only kind of "ought" that he was discussing was one that was internal
to the practice of promising. 17 It would still be open for someone to
reject the entire practice of promising, or to argue that some or all of
that practice's rules were unjust. Searle's derivation of "ought" from
"is" was never intended to supply the answer to this kind of "ought"
question.
In consequence, writers have had to look elsewhere for the source
of the moral obligation to respect the rules of promising. Here, too,
the various explanations can be grouped into two categories, which
correspond in some ways to the two theories discussed in the preceding section concerning what the rules of promising actually require.
Some writers have argued that the obligations created by a promise
can only be explained by positing that individual promisors possess
13. 73 PHIL. REV. 43 (1964).
14. Id. at 54-55.
15. Id. at 55-56.
16. See, e.g., Carey, How to Confuse Commitment with Obligation, 72 J. PHIL. 276 (1975);
Hare, The Promising Game, 70 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 398 (1964); Jones,
Making and Keeping Promises, 76 ETHICS 287 (1966); Miller, Constitutive Rules and Essential
Ru/es, 39 PHIL. STUD. 183 (1981); Robins, The Primacy of Promising, 85 MIND 321, 329-30
(1976).
17. J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 188-89 (1969).
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"norm-creating powers," under which they are authorized to create
new moral obligations merely by agreeing to do so. Others have argued that no such powers are necessary, and that the moral obligation
to keep a promise is merely a particular instance of a more general
obligation, such as the obligation not to cause harm to others or the
obligation to tell the truth. Each theory will be discussed below.
1. Promises and Norm-Creating Powers
Joseph Raz has offered the most complete defense of the position
that the moral obligation to respect the rules of promising must rest on
some norm-creating power possessed by the promisor. 18 Without being quite as explicit, and without necessarily agreeing with other aspects of Raz's theory, other writers have taken an essentially similar
position. For example, Charles Fried has argued that notions of individual freedom and autonomy require that individuals be allowed to
bind themselves by promising. 19 Economists have pointed to the social utility of allowing individuals to bind themselves to a future
course of conduct, to make it easier for others to arrange their lives in
reliance on the promise. 20 In Raz's terms, all of these are arguments
that individuals ought to have at least one norm-creating power: the
power to create a moral obligation by making a promise.
' In a somewhat similar vein, Randy Barnett has argued that
promises are best viewed as marking the promiser's consent to the
transfer of part of her bundle of property rights. 21 "Property rights"
are meant here in the broadest possible sense; they thus include future
rights such as "the right to fifty bushels of wheat on August 1," or
even disjunctive rights such as "the right to fifty bushels of wheat or
their equivalent in money." On this view, if a seller has consented to
transfer to a buyer the right to "fifty bushels of wheat on August l,"
the seller no longer has any right to control those bushels when August 1 arrives, so her retention of those bushels would constitute the
taking of another's property. Barnett's account of promising might
seem more parsimonious than Raz's, as Barnett grounds the force of a
promise in an already recognized power - the power to transfer prop18. Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 ARISTOTELIAN SocY. 79 (Supp.
Vol. 1972). For a somewhat similar position, see Robins, supra note 16.
19. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 14-17.
20. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89
YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
21. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). As Barnett
notes, this view of contract law dates back at least as far as Blackstone's Commentaries. Id. at
292 n.98;seea/so P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 179 (1981) (attributing this view of
promising to Hobbes).
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erty - rather than having to posit a separate normative power for
promising. Notice, though, that the power to transfer title to property
is itself an instance of what Raz would term a norm-creating power.
In this sense, Barnett's theory is merely a particular example of the
kind of theory that Raz believes necessary to account for the moral
force of the rules of promising. 22
Of course, positing a norm-creating power of this sort merely
pushes the normative question back one step: What justifies the existence of this norm-creating power? To this question, many different
answers can be and have been given. Economists usually rely on utilitarian justifications, arguing that a rule letting people make enforceable promises is likely (under certain conditions) to lead to the best use
of resources. As noted above, Fried justifies the power to bind oneself
as a corollary of respect for autonomy and individual freedom. Raz
tentatively suggests a somewhat different answer: since promises create a special relationship between the promisor and promisee, the
power to create such relationships is morally justified only if those relationships are themselves desirable. 23
I will argue below that, when it comes to deriving legal implications, it may well make a difference which argument is used to justify
these norm-creating powers. 24 In the philosophical literature on
promising, though, these differences are less important (and receive
less discussion) because all of these arguments lead to the same conclusion: that individuals ought to have the norm-creating power represented by promising. Thus, all of these theorists find themselves on
one side of a divide, with the other side occupied by the theorists to be
discussed in the next two sections.
2. Promises and Harm to Others

A different approach to explaining the moral force of the rules of
promising begins with the observation that breaking a promise will
22. Raz occasionally distinguishes between consenting and promising, but his examples suggest that he is simply using "consent" in a sense that is narrower than Barnett's usage. For
example, Raz argues that one can consent to give someone a right to some action, but cannot
consent to give someone a mere right of recipience, such as the right to be paid a sum of money.
Raz, Authority and Consent, supra note 8, at 121-22. Thus, where Barnett would say that a
tenant has consented to transfer to her landlord the right to $1000 per month for each of the next
12 months, Raz would simply say that the tenant has promised to pay that sum. As nearly as I
can tell, nothing turns on this difference in usage.
23. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 227-28. In another context (while discussing consent generally), Raz has also noted the traditional instrumental arguments that letting
people make their own promises is likely to lead to the best use of resources, or that promises
develop peoples' characters and train them in such useful virtues as cooperation and careful
planning. Raz, Authority and Consent, supra note 8, at 123-25.
24. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
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often harm the promisee, especially if he has relied on the promise in
any way. If there is a general principle that one ought not cause harm
to others, that might be enough to justify some sort of rule against
promise-breaking, at least when breaking the promise would in fact
cause harm. In particular, this justification would fit well with the
view that the only obligation imposed by a promise is an obligation to
take this harm into account, as one reason - not necessarily the only
one, or even a dispositive one - in favor of performing the promised
action. 25
Most people, though, are unwilling to equate a general obligation
not to harm others with the specific obligation imposed by a promise.
Imagine, for example, that a complete stranger walks up to you and
says that he· has formed the belief that you are about to give him
$50,000 - and, moreover, that he has relied on this expectation by
incurring various debts and obligations, none of which he would have
incurred had he not believed that you were about to give him the
money. The stranger's predicament in this case might provide a slight
reason for you to help him out by giving him the $50,000 - after all,
helping a fellow citizen is almost always a good reason for action but it will not be a very strong one. Moreover, none of the writers
cited above would say that preventing harm to the stranger is as strong
a reason for action in this case as it would be if you had promised to
give him $50,000, and your promise was what led him to incur his
additional debts. Thus, some further argument is necessary to explain
the particular force of the reason for action that is generated once a
promise has been made. 2 6
Some writers have tried to explain the additional force generateg
by a promise by pointing to the fact that a person who makes a promise has thereby caused the rise in the other party's expectations, and
has likewise been a cause of the other party's reliance on the promise. 27 By contrast, the example in the preceding paragraph involved
expectations and reliance which could not be causally attributed to
any action of the person charged with the obligation. Thus, these
writers rest the moral force of promissory obligations on a narrower
form of the harm principle. While there is no obligation, or at best a
very weak obligation, to take steps to prevent harm to others (these
25. See supra note 12.
26. For other criticisms of the bare-reliance argument, using examples similar to the one in
the text, see C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 10-11; Raz, Promises in Morality and Law (Book Review),
95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 924-25 (1982).
27. E.g., MacCormick, supra note 12, at 66-67.
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writers would say), there is a much stronger obligation not actively to
cause that harm.
Even this principle may be too broad, however. As a number of
writers have pointed out, it is easy to imagine cases where one person
has caused another to rely in some way, but the resulting obligation
does not seem as strong as if the first person had made a promise to the
second. Raz suggests the example of someone who informs a friend
that she will almost certainly be able to offer the friend a ride into
town, and that the likelihood of her being able to do so is sufficiently
high that it makes perfect sense for the friend to rely on her rather
than making alternative arrangements - but who warns, "remember
- I do not promise anything, I am merely advising you. " 28 In such a
case, the friend presumably would be perfectly justified in relying on
the statement by forgoing any alternative arrangements. The friend's
lack of alternative arrangements may even be a factor that the speaker
ought to consider in subsequently deciding whether to change her
plans in some way that would prevent her from offering the ride.
However, the force of this reason for going through with the offered
ride still does not seem as strong as if the speaker had offered the ride
and said, "I promise I'll be there." Thus, a promise still seems to add
something to the force of the reasons for action over and above the
force that can be attributed to the principle of not causing harm to
others.
A closely related objection notes that the notion of "cause" employed in this argument is more than a little problematic. 2 9 Reliance
on a promise is always caused (in a "but for" sense) by the promisee as
well as by the promisor, for it is the promisee who chooses to rely.
Thus, some further argument is needed to explain why we quickly attribute moral responsibility for another person's reliance to someone
who has promised a particular action, but are less quick to attribute as
much responsibility to someone who has made clear that she is not
promising anything. To say that the person who relies assumes the
risk of being disappointed if the other person's statement falls short of
being a promise, but does not assume that risk if the other person has
made an actual promise, is no answer. Such a response simply posits a
difference in the extent of the speaker's responsibility in each case,
when it is precisely that difference that needs a moral justification.30
28. Raz, supra note 18, at 99.
29. For an exceptionally clear statement of this objection, see P. ATIYAH, supra note 21, at
63-69; see also G. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 98-100 (1971); Robins, supra note 16.
30. Occasionally, the objection discussed in this paragraph is made by asserting that we can·
not determine whether the promisee's reliance is reasonable without knowing whether the prom·
ise is binding on the promisor. E.g., Barnett, supra note 21, at 275. However, Raz's example of
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Patrick Atiyah suggested that the greater responsibility of a promisor might be explained by treating the promise as a conqlusive admission that responsibility properly rested on the promisor. That is,
Atiyah viewed the allocation of responsibility for the promisee's reliance as a question of social policy, which would normally have to be
settled by a court or legislature or other lawmaking institution. 31 He
then suggested that if an individual promisor admits that she should
be responsible for the other party's reliance, by making an explicit
promise, that sort of admission against interest should usually be
treated as conclusively settling the social policy issue.n Notice,
though, that this argument grants to individual promisors exactly the
sort of norm-creating power for which Joseph Raz has argued. 33 If
individual promisors have the sovereign-like authority to determine
conclusively who should bear responsibility for certain losses, they are
exercising a power whose existence must be justified by some principle
beyond the general notion of not causing harm to others.
3. Promises and Misrepresentation

The attempt to explain why a speaker's responsibility seems
greater if she has made a definite promise - even if the harm to the
other party is no greater than in an otherwise similar case where no
promise has been made - is one of the factors that led many writers
to posit a separate, norm-creating power which individuals can exercise by making a promise. Other writers, however, have responded by
narrowing the harm principle still further, saying that there is a particularly strong obligation not to cause harm to others by making false
statements. Alternatively, the "harm" element can be eliminated entirely, if there is an obligation not to misrepresent the truth regardless
of whether the misrepresentation causes any actual harm. Under
either of these views, which I will refer to collectively as the "misrepresentation theory," the key fact is not that breaking a promise causes
harm, but that breaking a promise violates the obligation to tell the
truth. 34
one friend informing another of a possible ride into town is enough to refute this proposition, by
showing that there can be cases where it is reasonable for the promisee to rely regardless of
whether the promise is binding. For further discussions of this issue, see McNeilly, Promises Demoralized, 81 PHIL. REV. 63 (1971); Narveson, supra note 11. Assertions such as Barnett's are
probably better interpreted as making the argument discussed in the text: that we cannot know
whether it is reasonable to attribute responsibility for the reliance to the promisor without first
deciding whether the promise is binding.
31. P. ATIYAH, supra note 21, at 68-69.
32. Id. at 184-202.
33. Raz, supra note 26, at 926-27.
34. For examples of this approach, see G. WARNOCK, supra note 29, at 101-11; Arda!, Ought
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The misrepresentation theory reaches this conclusion by interpreting all promises as representations about the promisor's future conduct. A person who promises to give a friend a ride has made a
definite statement about what will happen in the future. If she then
fails to come through with the ride, her failure makes this statement
about the future a false one, thereby violating the obligation to tell the
truth (in addition to causing harm). By contrast, a person who says
that she will probably give her friend a ride, but who reserves the right
to change her mind, has made a much weaker probabilistic statement
about the future. That person's failure to perform would not make her
previous statement false, and therefore would not violate the obligation to tell the truth, even though it might cause the same amount of
harm to her friend. According to the misrepresentation theory, this is
why a person who promises to give her friend a ride has a stronger
reason to do so than does a person who has merely said that she is
likely to give her friend a ride, without actually promising.
·
Admittedly, the obligation to tell the truth appears here in what
may be an unfamiliar guise. The obligation has some elements of strict
liability, for it is no defense to say that at the time of promising the
speaker thought that her statement would come true. 35 In addition,
the obligation to tell the truth is perhaps more usually thought of as an
obligation limiting what one is allowed to say, by obliging people not
to say anything that is false. Under this theory, though, the obligation
limits what speakers can do, by forbidding people from doing anything
that will make their prior statements turn out to be false. Rather than
requiring people to conform their statements to reality, the misrepresentation theory of promising requires people to act in such a way that
reality will conform to their prior statements. 36
In some respects, then, the misrepresentation theory is not that
different from theories based on the notion of norm-creating powers,
as discussed above. If the obligation to tell the truth means that an
individual, by choosing to making a definite statement about the future, can thereby place herself under an obligation to make sure that
her statement comes true, then that individual certainly has the power
to create an obligation of some sort. This obligation need not be of the
sort discussed above ih section I.A.1, however, which obliged the
We To Keep Contracts Because They Are Promises?, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 655 (1983); Ardal, supra
note 11, at 225; Fogelin, Richard Price on Promising: A Limited Defense, 21 J. HIST. PHIL. 289
(1983); Hanfling, supra note 12, at 24-25.
35. Compare the position of Charles Fried, discussed infra at note 68.
36. For a more extended discussion of this aspect of the theory, see Fogelin, supra note 34, at
296-97.
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speaker not to consider certain reasons which might otherwise counsel
against doing the promised act. The misrepresentation theory is
equally consistent with obligations of the sort described in section
I.A.2, which merely add the value of telling the truth as an additional
reason in favor of performi~g the promised action.
II.

THE NEEDS OF CONTRACT LAW

The rules of contract law can be divided into two categories:
"background rules" and ~·agreement rules." As discussed earlier,
background rules define the exact substance of a party's obligation, by
specifying (among other things) the conditions under which her nonperformance will be excused, and the sanctions which will be applied
to any unexcused nonperformance. By contrast, agreement rules specify the conditions and procedures the parties must satisfy in order to
change an otherwise applicable background rule. Agreement rules
thus include most of the rules governing offer and acceptance, as well
as such doctrines as fraud or undue influence, which define the conditions necessary for a party's apparent consent to be counted as truly
valid. 37 To be sure, these two categories are not mutually exclusive,
for some rules serve both functions simultaneously. For example, the
"mailbox rule" defines a procedure by which parties can agree to a
contract changing any otherwise applicable background rule. It also
provides a background rule of its own, by providing that the offeror's
power to retract her offer ends as soon as an acceptance is posted (unless the offer itself provided otherwise). Notwithstanding such instances of overlap, the distinction between background rules and
agreement rules is still useful in understanding the relationship between the philosophical theories of promising and the content of contract law.
The philosophical theories discussed above may well have some
relevance for contract law's agreement rules. For example, theories
that ground the enforceability of promises on individual liberty might
argue that the parties should be allowed to overturn nearly all of contract law's background rules by an appropriate agreement, thereby affording a much wider scope for the operation of whatever agreement
rules the law adopts. Different philosophical theories might even have
different implications for the content of those agreement rules - for
example, the degree of force needed to make an individual's consent
no longer voluntary, or the amount of information needed to make an
37. If the law does not permit a particular background rule to be varied by the parties, then
the set of "agreement rules" available to change that background is of course the null set. For a
slightly different classification of contract rules, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3.
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individual's consent sufficiently informed. In this article, I am not
concerned with the content of contract law's agreement rules, so I will
not explore these implications further.
It is less clear that the philosophical literature discussed above has
any implications. for the content of contract law's background rules.
All of the authors discussed above recognize that any real system of
promising would have to include some set of rules governing excuses,
remedies, and other details of the promisor's obligation. 38 Their purpose, however, was to analyze the practice of promising at a higher
level of abstraction. They were interested in the elements all promises
had in common, regardless of the action ¢ that was promised, and
largely regardless of the background rules governing such topics as
remedies or excuses. Granted, a sufficiently extreme background rule
- e.g., one excusing nonperformance whenever the promisor no
longer felt like performing - might deprive a so-called "promise" of
any binding force at all, thereby eliminating the very aspect of promising that interested these philosophers, and excluding the practice governed by such a rule from the scope of their analysis. Within those
limits, though, the rules governing such topics as remedies and excuses
could effectively be treated as just a more complete definition of the
exact obligation undertaken by the promisor - in other words, as just
another aspect of ¢. The goal of the writings described above was to
explain how and why a promisor could be bound to live up to any ¢,
regardless of exactly what that particular ¢ required.
This indifference to the content of ¢ should not be taken to mean
that these authors beiieved that the appropriate background rules
could be determined simply by looking to the explicit content of a
party's promise. At a minimum, the parties' specifications would be
relevant only if the rule were one the parties were free to vary - a
"default rule" in the terminology I have used here. Not all of the
writers discussed above are willing to grant the parties that much
power over every aspect of their obligation. 3 9
Even when a background rule concerns a topic that everyone
agrees the parties should be allowed to vary - say, the extent of the
· warranty in the sale of a used automobile by a private individual many parties simply will not address that topic in their agreement, so
there will be nothing in the agreement's explicit content to resolve this
issue. As a result, some method must be found to interpret the parties'
agreement, to provide rules governing any topic not explicitly settled
38. See, for example, the passage from Rawls quoted in the text supra at note 7.
39. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 26, at 932.
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by the parties. Indeed, creative interpretation is often needed to determine whether there has been any binding promise at all, for even this
fundamental question is not always explicitly settled by. the parties.4?
While it is perhaps more common to speak of "interpretation" in cases
where parties attempt to resolve an issue but do so with insufficient
clarity, and to speak of applying default rules in cases where the parties made no attempt to address an issue, the principle is much the
same in either case. 41 Both require an outside agency, such as a court,
to choose the exact rules defining the parties' obligations where the
parties have not unmistakably chosen some rule of their own.
A. Possible Sources of Law
The philosophical literature discussed above does not address these
issues of interpretation and appropriate default rules. As that literature is concerned with the question of how promises could bind even
in the best of circumstances, its focus is implicitly limited to cases
where there is no question that a promise has been made, and no difficulty in determining the exact content of the promised action ¢. That
literature may still contribute, however, to the law's resolution of these
issues. There are many possible ways of resolving questions of interpretation or background rules, and at least two are perfectly consistent
with many of the philosophical positions described above. The first
involves a sociological inquiry into the actual practices and customs
that exist in any particular community, as a guide to interpreting particular utterances and filling in appropriate background rules. The
second involves an appeal to the deeper philosophical values used to
justify the institution of promising - that is, values such as social
utility or individual freedom or encouraging valuable relationships
(depending on the theory of promising employed). Each of these will
be discussed below.
1. Existing Expectations
The frequent references in the philosophical literature to the "practice" or "institution" of promising could be taken to suggest that the
exact scope of any promissory obligation is a matter of sociological
fact, to be discovered by careful investigation into the practice of
40. For some famous instances of ambiguity in this respect, see United Steel Workers, Local
1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (N.D. Ohio), ajfd. in part and vacated in
part, 631F.2d1264 (6th Cir. 1980); Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo.
App. 383, 387-92, 105 S.W. 777 (1907).
41. For a more extended discussion of the similarities between interpretation and the selection of default rules, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 264-86.
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promising as it exists in the relevant community. 42 For instance, an
inquiry into the use of promises in late twentieth-century America
might show that promisors were regularly excused whenever performance became commercially impracticable, or it might show that
promisors were never excused no matter how difficult performance
had become. In either case, the results of that inquiry would define
the exact scope of the obligation that any late twentieth-century
American had accepted when she made a promise.
Of course, any serious sociological inquiry would very likely identify several different forms of promising, each with different background rules and assumptions, even within a single community. 43 At
the very least, it would certainly be possible for a society to recognize
several different kinds of promises, each with a different set of rules
defining the exact scope of the obligation. For example, a society
could have one kind of promise that imposes an absolute obligation to
perform (in legal terms, one that exposes the promisor to a suit for
"specific performance"), another that imposes an obligation to perform or to pay the equivalent in money ("expectation damages"), and
a third that imposes an obligation to perform or to make good any
losses the promisee may have suffered by relying on the promise ("reliance damages"). The community could also use promises that impose
an obligation to perform unless performance became extremely difficult in some unexpected way (in legal terms, promises subject to the
defense of commercial impracticability), and promises that permit no
such excuse.
The possibility of more than one kind of promise greatly complicates the difficulties involved in interpreting the sociological data
about a society's practices. For example, obvious questions arise concerning the number of people who must follow any set of rules for
those rules to be accepted as a legally relevant practice. Must an institution be recognized in the community prior to its invocation in any
particular transaction, or can any two parties create a custom-made
form of promising on the spur of the moment?44 A related question
involves the way we conceive of an individual who appears to be violating the rules of an existing practice: Is she merely an ordinary rulebreaker, or a pathbreaking pioneer in the creation of a new, perhaps
42. I use "sociological" here in its broadest possible sense, to include existing rules of con·
tract law as well as any extra-legal or private promissory practices.
43. As a number of authors have recognized-e.g.. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 308-10 (1980); Jones, supra note 16, at 296; Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra
note 8, at 227-28.
44. The latter position is suggested by Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 214-15.
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more desirable form of promising? Other difficulties include the problem of conflicting expectations at different levels of generality - for
example, if people expect written contracts to be binding, but they also
expect goods to be sold at a fair price, what is their expectation regarding the force of a written contract that sets an unfair price? And what
of the potential for circularity that arises when people's expectations
are themselves affected by existing legal rules?45
These problems in inferring morally relevant categories from
purely empirical data are well-known, so I will not pursue them here.
Instead, for the remainder of this section I will assume that sociologists can identify the set of promises - call them promisei. promise2,
... promisen - available to members of any particular society. However, this identification of the relevant choice set does not exhaust the
possible uses of sociology. In order to reach a decision about any particular case, the courts must have some method of determining which
kind of promise was actually made by the parties to any given
transaction.
One can imagine societies in which this second question would be
easy to answer - e.g., societies with a system of formal devices by
which individuals could signal their choice of institutions. For example, the society might require all binding promises to be signed with a
seal (ignoring for the moment the possibility of different kinds of binding promises), while treating any promises not made under seal as
nonbinding. In such a society, the problem of interpreting the parties'
utterances would deserve the lack of attention it received in the philosophical writings about promises, for it would be, quite literally, nothing but a formality.
The difficulty, of course, is that most societies do not use this
method of interpreting parties' utterances, and for good reason. Even
when there are only two kinds of promises from which to choose,
many writers have commented on the difficulties of expecting all lay
people to understand the use of the seal, and the apparent harshness of
enforcing one set of rules against parties who clearly intended a different set to apply but who forgot to use the appropriate formality. 46
45. See, e.g., Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 837
(1983) ("The law presumably is one factor shaping standards of social and especially commercial
behavior. People's 'expectations' and merchants' notions of 'good faith' are to some extent dependent on the positive, public expression of norms by contract law itself."). But see id. at 84445 ("Contemporary and historical research suggests that people generally don't know or don't
care much about the rules of contract law and generally carry out their affairs with little regard
for them.").
46. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1697 (1976).
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These difficulties multiply rapidly if there are more than two kinds of
promises - that is, more than two permissible sets of background
rules - from which to choose. It would be very difficult to design a
different seal for each of one hundred possible sets of promissory rules
- and even more difficult to expect everybody to remember which
seal they should use for each purpose. As a consequence, courts following this approach may have to appeal to sociology not only to identify the set of promises recognized in any particular society, but also to
identify the more complex signals by which different kinds of promises
are invoked. For example, a survey to determine what people usually
mean when they say "I promise" or "I intend" might tell us what kind
of commitment people usually have in mind when they make those
noises - or, if the inquiry becomes more particularized, when they
make those noises in particular contexts. Indeed, this is part of what
courts do under current contract law when they inquire into the "reasonable interpretation" of the parties' language. 47
Notice, though, that this kind of inquiry takes judges far beyond
the "small number of basic moral principles" referred to in the introduction to this article. If we must rely on sociological investigation to
identify the set of possible background rules, and also to tell us which
set of rules applies in any particular case, then sociology is doing virtually all of the work involved in fulfilling the needs of contract law.
This alone is enough to defeat the claim referred to in the introduction
that the philosophy of promising can by itself yield definite implications for the content of contract law.
2. Substantive Moral Values
A more serious objection to this total reliance on sociological data
is that it provides no perspective from which to criticize existing promissory practices, or to propose reforms in those practices. One might
criticize particular legal rules for not properly conforming to those
practices, but there would be no way to criticize the practices themselves. However, sociology is not the only possible source of content
for contract law's background rules. An alternative is to look to the
substantive values which justify the binding force of promises in the
first place (according to one of the philosophical theories discussed
earlier), to see if those values have implications for contract law's
background rules.
Economic analysis is the most familiar instance of this method of
determining the content of contract law's background rules. From an
47. But not the whole part - see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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economic perspective, if society is justified in giving individuals the
power to make morally binding promises, it is because such promises
will, under certain conditions, lead to the most efficient satisfaction of
human wants. This notion of efficiency (or some variant of it) can
then be used to choose among various possible background rules, by
identifying the rule that would contribute most to efficiency. For example, there is an extensive body of literature analyzing different contract remedies to determine which remedies are most efficient in which
situations.48 Economists have also addressed the question of the most
efficient rule for excusing promisors who fail to perform because of
unexpected difficulties in performance,49 and the conditions under
which individuals' promises should not be treated as binding because
of "market failures" that distort the promisor's incentives. 50
John Rawls provides another example of how background rules
might be chosen in order best to serve the substantive values that justify the binding force of promises in the first place. Rawls argued that
the binding force of promises is justified if and only if the rules of
promising - the background rules, in the terminology used here are themselves consistent with principles of justice. For Rawls, this
meant that they must lead to an equal distribution of all "primary
48. For nontechnical introductions to this literature, see A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND EcoNOMICS ch. 5 (1983); Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 629 (1988); Kornhauser, An Introduction to the
Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986). More technical
analyses include Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985); Craswen, Peiformance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989); Craswen, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988); Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach 'of Co!ltract,
26 J.L. & ECON. 691 (1983); Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 39 (1984);' Shaven, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for
Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121 (1984); Shaven, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J.
EcoN. 466 (1980).
•
49. See, e.g., Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
311 (1982); Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. INST. & THEOR. ~ON. 100
(1988); Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Perloff, The Effects ofBreaches ofForward Contracts Due to Unanticipated Price Changes, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 221 (1981); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and
Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Sykes,
Increased Cost of Peiformance and the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming Jan. 1990); White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988).
50. E.g., Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1976);
Ordover & Weiss, Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal Restrictions on Competitive Contracts, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 399 (1981); Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit,
and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 EcoN. INQUIRY 188 (1984); Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 630 (1979); Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053 (1977).
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social goods" (liberty, wealth, etc.), except to the extent that an unequal distribution would benefit every member of society.s 1 This provides a slightly different criterion for judging possible background
rules - although one that will overlap with economic analysis when
assessing the ways in which different rules benefit the contracting
parties.s2
Other writers have focused on other substantive values, which
could lead them to different conclusions about the proper background
rules. For example, John Finnis has argued that the binding force of
promises is justified because of the way promises can solve coordination problems.s3 This enables him to endorse whatever background
rules are most likely to serve this coordination goal. s4 Still another
example can be found in Joseph Raz's suggestion that the binding
force of promises is justified by the value of the special relationships
which promises create. ss Though Raz does not develop this theory at
any length, it might be possible to decide which of all possible relationships were the most valuable and to adopt the background rules that
best facilitated those relationships. For example, if relationships that
can be terminated at will are less desirable than those that are more
difficult to terminate, that might justify a background rule providing
for a relatively large measure of damages for breach of contract.
It is important to realize that the selection of background rules
designed to promote the substantive values that justify making
promises binding is not necessarily inconsistent with freedom of contract. Under a strong version of this approach - that is, a version
arguing that the selected background rules should be mandatory freedom of contract would indeed be restricted. s6 But this approach
can also be used in a milder version, endorsing the preferred back51. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 344-48 (1971). The principles of justice themselves
are discussed at more length in id. at 54-117. '
52. See id. at 67-83.
53. J. FINNIS, supra note 43, at 298-308. See also the discussion of coordination problems in
J. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 346-48.
54. See J. FINNIS, supra note 43, at 320-25 (discussing whether contractual obligations
should be viewed as giving the promisor a free election between performing and paying
damages).
55. See Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 227-28; see also supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
56. For various perspectives on arguments that might justify the strong version of one of
these theories, see Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POLY.
Autumn 1986, at 179; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tori Law,
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV.
563 (1982); Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See also the previously cited economics
articles, supra note 50.
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ground rules merely as default rules or methods of interpretation for
those cases where the parties have not specified a preference for some
other rule. 57 Any system of law, however committed it may be to the
idea of freedom of contract, must have some way of resolving those
issues on which the parties' contract is silent cir ambiguous. A rebuttable presumption in favor of the rule that best serves some substantive
moral value is one way to resolve such cases.
B.

Unhelpful Substantive Values

The preceding section argued that background rules could sometimes be derived from whatever substantive values justified the binding
force ~f promises in the first place. However, only some of the philosophical theories discussed in section l.B rest on substantive values
that are of any help in selecting background rules. In this section, I
argue that theories which justify the binding force of promises on the
basis of the obligation to tell the truth, or on considerations of individual liberty and autonomy, are of no help at all in such an enterprise.
Part III then documents this claim by examining writers who attempt
to derive implications for contract law from theories based on individual autonomy or the obligation to tell the truth.
1.

Preventing Misrepresentation

One of the philosophical theories discussed earlier held that
promises derive their binding force from the fact that failing to carry
out a promise would falsify the promise as a definite statement about
the future, thereby violating the obligation to tell the truth. 58 Assume,
for the moment, that this theory is sound. The question is what, if
anything, it tells us about the proper background rules of contract law.
With respect to the rules governing implied obligations, such as .
implied warranties, the misrepresentation theory tells us very little.
For example, suppose that someone says, "I promise to give you my
car in exchange for $5000," and then delivers a car that doesn't run.
The misrepresentation theory says that· if the speaker can properly be
interpreted as saying "I will definitely give you my car, and it will be
in good running condition," then the speaker's failure to· do so will
make her statement false, thereby violating her obligation to tell the
truth. On the other hand, the misrepresentation theory also says that
57. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921)
("From the conclusion that promises may not be treated [as one of the parties had urged] without a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that they may not be so
treated without a perversion of intention.").
58. See supra section I.B.3.
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if the speaker is ·more properly interpreted as saying "I will definitely
give you my car, but I guarantee nothing about its condition," the
speaker's failure to deliver a working car will not falsify her earlier
statement. In other words, the misrepresentation theory leaves the
proper outcome entirely dependent on the proper interpretation of the
speaker's promise.
There are, of course, any number of ways to resolve this interpretation question. We could look to sociology to tell us how much
responsibility most people expect sellers to assume under these circumstances. Alternatively, we could look to other substantive values
to try to resolve the interpretation question. For example, if it is more
efficient to put responsibility for such problems on the seller, or if relationships that continue over time are for some reason considered more
desirable than relationships where each side's involvement ends as
soon as the goods change hands, that might justify interpreting such
statements as committing the seller to an implied warranty, at least in
the absence of explicit statements to the contrary.
Notice, though, that nothing about the misrepresentation theory
tells us which method of interpretation we ought to use. The misrepresentation theory is consistent with interpreting promises in accord
with whatever default rule most people already expect, or whatever
default rule would be most efficient, or whatever default rule best
serves some substantive value other than economic efficiency. While
the misrepresentation theory of promising tells us that people must
live up to the proper interpretation of their promise, it is equally consistent with any of the ways in which the proper interpretation might
be identified. 59 Thus, knowing that contracts should be enforced in
order to prevent misrepresentation tells us nothing about which
method of interpretation ought to be employed, or anything else relevant to deciding whether there should be an implied warranty in this
transaction.
For similar reasons, the misrepresentation theory also tells us little
about the background rules governing the proper remedy for nonperformance. If the speaker's promise is interpreted as saying, "I will
definitely give you this car, rather than any substitute," then only the
delivery of the actual car could avoid falsifying that statement, suggesting that a remedy of specific performance would be most appropriate. But other interpretations are also possible - for example, "I will
give you this car, or else give you enough money to let you buy an59. For a more extensive discussion of this point, with reference to the law of false advertising, see Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985).
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other car just like it." If this is the proper interpretation to place on
the speaker's remarks, ordinary market-value damages would be
enough to avoid falsifying her statement. Other interpretations are
equally possible - e.g., " ... or else I'll return your purchase price,"
" ... or else I'll make good your reliance expenses," or even ". . . or
else I'll pay you X dollars to make up for it," where X could be any
number under the sun.
It might be argued that the misrepresentation theory at least establishes that the seller's failure to deliver the car is wrong, and therefore
deserves at least some sanction. That is, the misrepresentation theory
might seem to point us"to punishment theory - to principles of deterrence or retribution, or arguments that the severity of the punishment
ought to be proportional to the gravity of the offense - to determine
the appropriate sanction for nonperformance. However, even this
conclusion depends on an implicit resolution of the interpretation issue discussed in the preceding paragraph. If the seller's statement is
best interpreted in one of the ways discussed above - say, "I will
definitely give you this car, or else I'll return your purchase price" then there is nothing wrong with the seller's failure to deliver the car,
so long as she is at least willing to return the purchase price. Thus, if
the quoted language represents the best interpretation of the seller's
statement (according to some theory of what makes for the best interpretation), the question of the proper remedy for nondelivery is settled
without any need to appeal to punishment theory. To justify looking
to punishment theory to determine the sanction, a misrepresentation
theorist would first have to establish that the seller's remarks ought to
be interpreted as something other than any of the quoted propositions
suggested above.
Admittedly, most promisers probably do not explicitly have in
mind anything like those quoted propositions. 60 This may be why it
seems inherently correct or natural to treat the question of an appropriate remedy as a question for punishment theory, rather than as a
question of interpretation. If most promisors have in mind only something like "I will definitely give you this car," then that certainly could
be interpreted as an agreement that it would be wrong for the seller to
fail to tum over the car, thereby calling on punishment theory to determine the appropriate response. At a minimum, it could be argued
that such a construction ought to be adopted as the default rule,
thereby shifting to any seller who wanted some other remedy the burden of making a more explicit statement to the contrary.
60. See o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 237 (1963 ed.) ("when people make contracts,
they usually contemplate the performance rather than the breach").
-
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My argument is simply that this construction - the construction
that makes the appropriate sanction turn on some theory of punishment - is not in any way entailed by the misrepresentation theory of
promising. The value of telling the truth would in no way be compromised by adopting any of the other constructions discussed above,
thereby putting the burden of stating otherwise on sellers who object
to the chosen construction. Thus, if there is any reason for preferring
one possible construction over the others, that reason has to be something more than just the value of telling the truth. It must rest on
some belief about what most people already expect, and some argument about why the law ought to fulfill existing expectations; or a
belief about what default rule is most efficient, and some argument
about why the law should be concerned with efficiency (to cite just two
of the possibilities). In other words, the misrepresentation theory settles none of the possible questions about what values the law ought to
look to in selecting its background rules.
2. Individual Autonomy

Another view of promising justifies the moral force of a promise as
a necessary corollary of individual liberty or autonomy. 61 If promises
were not binding, it is argued, individual freedom would be unjustifiably restricted, as individuals would be deprived of the freedom to
place themselves under a moral obligation respecting their future conduct. While there may be a slight paradox in the notion that freedom
must include the freedom to limit one's freedom in the future, advocates of this theory resolve that paradox in favor of allowing individuals to make binding promises. 62
Autonomy-based theories may well have implications for what I
have called "agreement rules," or rules concerning the conditions
under which individuals will be allowed to vary the background rules
that would otherwise govern their relations. For example, these theorists generally oppose the restrictions on freedom of contract represented by the rule denying enforceability to promises unsupported by
consideration, or to promises that are deemed unconscionable. 63 More
precisely, they oppose restrictions on the enforceability of promises
unless true consent is lacking (e.g., cases of duress), or unless the sub61. E.g., C. FRIED, supra note 1.
62. Id. at 14. But cf. 1 M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON
EcONOMIC PRINCIPLES 153-55 (1962) (offering a libertarian argument that contracts for personal services should never be legally enforceable); see also infra note 64.
63. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 28-39, 103-09; Barnett, supra note 21, at 313-14.
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ject of the promise is not the promisor's to give away. 64 Thus, one
necessary part of these theories is a specification of the conditions
under which a party's apparent consent will be recognized as valid.
As long as these conditions are satisfied, autonomy-based theories hold
that any rule or obligation agreed to by the parties should be allowed
to govern their relationship.
In cases where the parties have not specified the rule they prefer,
however, autonomy-based theories have much less to tell us. In these
cases, autonomy-based theories run into the same problem as the misrepresentation theory. Just as any default rule would be consistent
with the obligation to tell the truth, any default rule would also be
consistent with individual freedom, as long as the parties are allowed
to change the rule by appropriate language. Consequently, some other
principle must be invoked to decide which of the many possible default
rules to adopt. The rule could be chosen by looking to sociological
data to determine which rule most parties already expect in various
circumstances; it could also be chosen by appealing to some substantive value such as economic efficiency, or Rawls' difference principle,
or any other view about what makes some kinds of contractual relationships more valuable than others. Thus, even if those principles
have been rejected as valid justifications for the binding force of
promises, one or more of them must still be selected to provide the
default rules for parties who have not unambiguously specified some
other rule in their contract.
The reason that misrepresentation and autonomy-based theories
are unhelpful in the selection of default rules is that, of all the philosophical theories discussed earlier in section I.B, these two share the
characteristic of being completely content-neutral. 65 They give rea64. Cf. Barnett, supra note 56, at 185-95, 197 (arguing that individuals cannot alienate control over their persons, and thus have no right to provide for the remedy of specific performance
in contracts for personal services). Barnett would, however, allow individuals to alienate the
disjunctive right to "my personal services or their value in monetary damages, if I subsequently
choose not to perform"; he thus would not render contracts for personal services completely
unenforceable. Id. at 197.
65. A similar concept, "content independence,'' is employed by Raz, Authority and Consent,
supra note 8, at 114-16 (discussing examples of content-independent reasons for action or belief,
including promises); see also J. R.Az, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 8, at 70
("[B]oth [decisions and promises] are content-independent reasons: regardless what you promise
or decide to do you have a reason to do it because you have promised or decided.").
Raz argued that theories describing the way in which promises constrain a promiser's subsequent deliberations - that is, theories of the sort discussed earlier in section I.A - had to be
content-neutral, or else they could not explain the constraint generated by the promise, as opposed to constraints that might argue in favor of doing ¢ even if no promise had ever been made.
However, Raz in no way suggested that theories explaining the moral force of those constraints
(theories of the sort discussed supra in section I.B) had to be neutral or indifferent with respect to
the content of¢. If anything, his suggestions about the special value of certain kinds of relationships suggest the contrary. Raz, Promises and Obligations, supra note 8, at 228.
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sons why an individual who has promised to do ¢ thereby incurs some
form of obligation to do ¢, regardless of how ¢ is filled in. The reason
for this neutrality is understandable: To do anything more requires a
theory that would tell people what kinds of promises they ought to
make. Unfortunately, the theorists' reluctance to advise individuals as
to how they ought to exercise their freedom to fill in the content of ¢
leaves them equally unable to give legal systems any guidance about
how to fill in the content of ¢ when contracting parties fail to specify
their preferred content. As a result, these two theories have nothing to
contribute to the selection of default rules governing such important
topics as implied terms and conditions, excuses, and remedies for
breach.
I should stress that this shortcoming in no way undercuts whatever
validity these misrepresentation or autonomy-based theories may have
in their original capacity, as justifications for the morally binding force
of promises. It simply means that if one of these theories is accepted
as the justification for the force of promises, some other theory or theories must then be added to provide a basis for selecting appropriate
background rules. This other theory must be a theory that is not neutral between the different ways of filling in the exact scope of the parties' obligation - for example, it must provide some reason for
preferring promises with an implied warranty to promises without an
implied warranty, or vice versa. In other words, this other theory
must rely on more than the value of individual autonomy or the value
of telling the truth.
III. Two

EXAMPLES

Part II demonstrated that even if one accepts any of the misrepresentation or autonomy-based theories as justifications for the moral
force of promises, there are still important choices to be made concerning the values used to select the law's background rules. Unfortunately, these choices usually receive much less attention from those
who write about contract law from the standpoint of misrepresentation or autonomy-based theories. As a result, those authors often end
up defending their choice of default rules on an indefensibly ad hoc
basis. At other times, they are led to oppose certain default rules unnecessarily, simply because those default rules are supported by certain values that were rivals to the misrepresentation or autonomybased theory at the level of a justification for the moral force of
promises. The final part of this article illustrates the difficulties that
such theorists encounter by considering the theories of Charles Fried
and Randy Barnett. These two authors have provided the most care-
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ful and comprehensive of recent attempts to give contract law a solid
philosophical grounding. In addition, each rests his theory of why
promises are binding on some version of the value of individual freedom or the obligation to tell the truth.
A.

Charles Fried

As noted earlier, Fried justifies the obligation to keep a promise
primarily by viewing it as a necessary corollary of individual autonomy. "If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation
... , to that extent we do not take [the promisor] seriously as a person."66 To be sure, Fried is somewhat ambiguous on this point, for he
also emphasizes the injury done to the promisee by the breaking of a
promise. For example, he argues that promise-breaking abuses the
promisee's trust in the promise, thereby violating the Kantian injunction against treating other people as means rather than as ends. 67 This
moves Fried much closer to the misrepresentation theorists: as Fried
himself puts it, promise-breaking "is like (but only like) lying." 68 But
since the autonomy-based and misrepresentation theories are equally
unhelpful when it comes to the selection of default rules, an exact classification of Fried's position as between these two theories is unnecessary to my analysis.
1. Expectation Damages

On the question of the appropriate remedy for breach, Fried supports the expectation measure of damages, which is designed to give
the promisee the same benefits he would have received had the promise been kept. According to Fried, "[i]f I make a promise to you, I
should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair that I
should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised
performance. " 69
A moment's consideration, however, will show that this conclusion
cannot be derived solely from the value of individual freedom and autonomy. Fried may well be correct that, in order to give free rein to an
66. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-21.
67. Id. at 16. I am indebted to John Gardner for pointing out this ambiguity in Fried's
position.
68. Id. Fried refuses to join the misrepresentation theorists entirely because he interprets the
obligation to tell the truth as an obligation not to lie knowingly, thereby imposing no restriction
at all on a promiser who at the time of her promise intended to keep the promise. Id. at 17.
Under the broader version of that obligation endorsed by most misrepresentation theorists, the
difference between their theory and Fried's would become very small. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
·
69. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 17.
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individual's autonomy, "[i]t is necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a course of conduct that would otherwise be optional for
me." 70 But almost any remedy - reliance damages, punitive damages, specific performance, etc. - makes the promised course of conduct non-optional to some degree, depending on the severity of the
threatened penalty. There is surely nothing in the idea of individual
autonomy that requires the exact degree of non-optionality provided
by the expectation measure. The idea of individual autonomy does
suggest that individuals should be allowed to make their conduct
nonoptional to any extent they choose, by specifying one of these remedies in their contract. But the law must still select one of these remedies as the default rule, and nothing in the notion of individual
autonomy gives any reason for favoring the expectation measure over
any of the otherl). 71
Fried might, of course, have some other value in mind which explains why the expectation measure is to be preferred (unless the parties specify otherwise) over any of the other possible measures. For
'example, Fried might believe that the expectation measure promotes
economic efficiency, or better satisfies Rawls' difference principle, or
would better solve most coordination problems. However, no such argument is made anywhere in his book.
Alternatively, Fried might be appealing to data about people's existing beliefs to justify his preference for the expectation measure. He
cannot be relying on existing nonlegal practices, for studies of those
practices show that people often do not demand (or offer) expectation
damages in cases of unexcused nonperformance. 72 However, Fried
might be taking existing legal practices as his normative benchmark,
for Anglo-American law often does employ the expectation measure of
damages. That is, Fried's argument might be that because the law
adopts liability for expectation damages as one incident of the obligation of promising, anyone who promises thereby accepts that liability
as one of the rules of the game. If this is Fried's argument, though, his
theory cannot be what justifies the law's choice of the expectation measure. The same argument would work equally well to explain why an
individual was obliged to respect any other damage rule the law happened to have adopted.
70. Id. at 13.
71. For similar criticisms of Fried's autonomy-based argument for expectation damages, see
Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 105, 106-08 (1989); Farber, Book Review, 66 MINN. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1982).
72. E.g., Epstein, supra note 71, at 112-21; Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
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Fried's only other argument in favor of the expectation measure is
really an argument against one of the possible alternatives, the reliance
measure of damages. When addressing the possible justifications for
the binding force of promises, Fried argues against the theory that
promises are binding only because promise-breaking would injure
those who relied on the promise. Fried goes on, however, to treat his
argument against that justification for the binding force of promises as
also being an argument against adopting the reliance measure of damages as a default rule. 73 That is,. he seems to assume that the reliance
measure of damages could only be justified as a default rule if one first
accepted the promisee's reliance as an explanation for the binding
force of a promise.
If this is Fried's argument, it rests on a non sequitur. Granted, one
way of arguing for the reliance measure of damages would be to argue
that the reason promises are binding is because promise-breaking injures those who rely on the promise. However, it hardly follows that
this is the only way that the reliance measure of damages can be supported, or that rejection of the reliance justification for the binding
force of promises also entails rejection of the reliance measure of damages. This error becomes even more obvious when it is recalled that
we are considering the reliance measure of damages as a default rule,
which would still leave the parties free to specify the expectation measure (or any other measure of damages) in its place. Adopting the
reliance measure merely as a default rule is in some ways inconsistent
with the theory that promises are binding only in order to prevent
reliance losses, for a default rule lets the parties agree to other damage
rules which would effectively make their promise binding even in the
absence of any reliance losses. The notion of reliance damages as a
default rule seems much more compatible with the views of someone
like Fried, who believes that the binding force of promises derives entirely from the freedom of the individual promisers.
In a nutshell, then, the difficulty with Fried's position on expectation damages is the difficulty identified earlier in Part II of this article.
Any damage measure is consistent with the ideal of individual autonomy, as long as it is adopted solely as a default rule, since any default
rule expands the promiser's options by making it easier for her to
make a certain kind of promise. Fried must therefore invoke some
other value in order to decide which of the many damage rules to
select as a starting point. Moreover, that value will necessarily be one
which Fried rejected as a possible justification for the binding force of
73. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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promises, for the only value serving that role for Fried - the value of
individual autonomy - is equally consistent with all default rules. To
choose a default rule, then, Fried has to let one of the other values
back into the analysis, and the only question is which one.
2. Rescission

Fried encounters a similar problem when he addresses the question
of whether a promisee's only remedy for nonperformance is to sue for
expectation damages, or whether the promisee should also have the
option of rescinding the contract and recovering any advance payments. Such an option could be extremely important to the promisee
if, for example, the market price of the promised goods had fallen
since the time of the contract. In such a case, the promisee would
much prefer to get his money back and buy the goods elsewhere (at
their new, lower price), rather than merely being allowed to recover
from the promisor the market value of any goods that were defective
or were not delivered.
Fried initially seems to regard the promisee's right to rescind the
contract as being a natural corollary of the binding force of promising.
"Parties bind themselves reciprocally. If one party treats himself as
not bound, the other may also treat himself as not bound. By breaking
his contract, a contractual partner not only opens himself up to claims
for damages but releases his opposite number." 74 This argument,
though, is subject to the same objections as Fried's argument about the
expectation measure. While a system of promising with that default
rule would certainly expand a promisor's freedom, so too would an
institution of promising with any other rule as its default rule. The
quoted passage merely asserts that our system of promising contains
rescission as one of its default remedies, without doing anything to
justify that rule.
Interestmgly, in this case Fried anticipates this very criticism.
That is, he acknowledges that it is possible for contracting parties to
provide either (a) that nonperformance by one party releases the other
party from the contract (in legal terms, making the promises conditional) or' (b) that nonperformance by one patty does not release the
other party from the contract, but only exposes the first party to a suit
for damages (in legal terms, making the promises indepertdent). He
also notes that such provisions need not be explicitly stated to be effective. 75 In other words, Fried recognizes that there are (at least?) two
74. Id. at 117.
75. Id. at 118-23.
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possible damage rules which parties should. be free to invoke, and that
the law must somehow decide which rule to treat as invoked in any
particular case. As he puts it much .earlier in the book, "does your
breaking your promise cancel my reciproca1 obligation to you or just
give me a remedy for my disappointment? There is no obvious a priori
reason for one or the other response." 76
.,_
In this case, Fried resolves the dilemma by an explicit appea1 to
existing expectations, which he reads as supporting a default rule that
includes the remedy of rescission. In his words, "[a]I].y other outcome
would disturb the expectations on which contractua1 terms are usually
established. " 77 Unfortunately, Fried says nothing to explain why the
expectations of most people in the community should necessarily be
dispositive in any individua1 case. Indeed, at other points in his analysis Fried seems to view the enforcement of community expectations as
somehow inconsistent with promissory principle8, belonging more to
the realm of tort. 78 The problem, of course, is that Fried has to look
to some outside value to decide whether rescission ought to be accepted as a norma1 default remedy. In this instance, he "solves'~ that
problem simply by asserting that community expectations ought to
govern the matter, without attempting any defense of that position.
3.

Other Default Rules

Similar difficulties resurface when· Fried turns to the rules governing ex(?use for impracticability, frustration, or m_istake. However,
Fried takes a somewhat different approach to the selection of the appropriate default rules for these subjects. Fried sees these rules as necessary to fill the "gaps" in the parties' agreement concerning problems
which in some sense were unexpected, and for which neither party had
agreed to assume responsibility. Because these rules relate to issues
outside the scope of the parties' agreement, Fried argues that their
justification need not rest on. his theory of promises as exercises of
individual autonomy. Instead, Fried views these rules as justified by
nonpromissory principles such as fault (responsibility for negligently
inflicted losses), or what he calls altruism (sharing among members of
76. Id. at 46 n.*.
77. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Fried cites no sociological data to support this claim:
78. Cf. id. at 4:
Now tort Jaw typically deals with involuntary transactions - if a punch in the nose, a traffic
accident, or a malicious piece of gossip may be called a transaction -.,-- so that the role of the
community in adjudicating the conflict is particularly prominent. . . . In contrast, so Jong as
we see contractual obligation as based on promise, on obligations that the parties have themselves assumed, the focus of the inquiry is on the will of the parties.
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a community). 79 In this context, then, Fried clearly recognizes that he
must appeal to substantive, non-content-neutral values.
Fried also believes that many of the rules governing contract formation must depend on values other than individual autonomy. Examples include the common law's "mailbox rule," which provides that
an offer· cannot be revoked after an acceptance has been posted by the
offeree; or the rule that an offer is deemed to lapse (and cannot later be
accepted) if it has once been rejected by the offeree. In this area, Fried
explicitly recognizes that any number of different default rules are consistent with his theory of promises, and that the offeror should be permitted to specify in her offer whatever rules she wants to apply. 80
Indeed, on the question of which default rule to adopt, he states that
"there are no reasons in principle, nothing entailed by the concepts
themselves, only considerations of fairness and convenience." 81 In analyzing particular rules, he usually takes the position that the most
sensible default rule would be whichever one most offerors would prefer, for that rule saves a majority of offerors the trouble of having to
specify a different rule. He then embarks on an analysis of the costs
and benefits of each rule to try to determine which rule most offerors
would prefer. az
In each of these areas, then, Fried is perfectly willing to appeal to
some non-content-neutral value such as "fairness and convenience,"
even though those may not be the values which justify the binding
force of promises. Once again, though, Fried never explains why he
chooses the particular values he does. For example, why do the rules
governing contract formation rest on arguments of "convenience"
about the rule that most promisors would prefer, while the rules governing impracticability and mistake rests on principles of "fairness"
such as equal sharing? The rules governing impracticability and mistake are always subject to variation by the parties' agreement, so the
argument that the law should adopt whatever rule most parties would
prefer (in order to save them the trouble of specifying otherwise)
would seem just as strong when applied to those issues. Alternatively,
if considerations of fairness trump the convenience of the promisor in
contracts involving unanticipated risks, why should they not also
79. Id. at ch. 5; see also id. at ch. 6 (taking a similar approach to the implied obligation of
"good faith"). For criticisms of this aspect of Fried's theory, see Aliyah, Book Review, 95
HARV. L. REV. 509, 520-23 (1981), and Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REV.
705, 719-23 (1983).
80. C. FRIED, supra note l, at 47-51.
81. Id. at 49.
82. See id. at 49 n. * (discussing the rule that an offer lapses once it is rejected by the offeree);
id. at 52 (discussing the mailbox rule).
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trump the convenience of offerers in cases of offers that are delayed in
the mail? Without any explicit theory explaining when each of these
different values is an appropriate guide, Fried's appeal to different values in different contexts looks more like an ex post rationalization of
the rules of contract law than a philosophical justification of those
rules.
Fried is also on weak ground in explaining his willingness in the
areas of impracticability and mistake to make an explicit appeal to
values other than individual autonomy, when he was unwilling to allow such appeals in considering the expectation measure of damages.
Fried's only justification for looking beyond considerations of individual autonomy when deciding on the rules governing impracticability
and mistake is his belief that most parties do not consciously consider
the rules they wish to apply to such unexpected contingencies, so enforcing any particular rule can only be justified as a form of involuntary liability. 83 The same is true, however, of parties who make
promises without consciously considering what remedies would be
available if the promiser fails to perform without an acceptable excuse. 84 If values other than individual freedom and autonomy can be
invoked to set the default rules governing impracticability and mistake, it is hard to see why they cannot also be invoked to set the default rules governing remedies for nonperformance.
When all is said and done, then, Fried's theory about what justifies
the binding force of promises - the theory which derives promises'
force from considerations of individual freedom and autonomy plays very little role in his derivation of any of the relevant default
rules. Unfortunately, Fried's preoccupation with his theory of promising seems to prevent him from developing a coherent theory of the
values that should play a role in selecting default rules. Sometimes
Fried relies on people's existing expectations; sometimes he uses economic arguments; sometimes he rests on principles of "fault" or "altruism"; and sometimes, as in the case of expectation damages, he
advances no justification at all. Such a scattershot approach to the
selection of default rules does little to advance our understanding of
contract law.
B.

Randy E. Barnett

As noted earlier, Barnett views promises as transferring to the
83. Id. at 60.
84. See supra note 60. A similar point has been made by Atiyah, Misrepresentation, Warranty, and Estoppel, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 347, 353 (i971).
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promisee the promisor's property right in the promised good or ser- ·
vice. He therefore treats the obligation to carry out a promise as a
specific instance of the more general obligation to respect property
rights. 85 While this explanation of the binding force of promises differs froni Fried's in some respects, Fried and Barnett are actually very
close on the underlying question of why anyone is obliged to respect
property rights (in Barnett's case) or promises (in Fried's). Just as
Fried defended the obligation to keep a promise on the ground that the
power to make binding promises is a necessary corollary of individual
liberty, Barnett sees the power to make binding transfers of property
as justifiable on essentially libertarian grounds. 86
Unlike Fried, however, Barnett does not view the obligation to
carry out one's promise as binding only when the promisor truly and
subjectively agrees to undertake that obligation. Barnett argues that
any workable system of property rights must make use of clear signals
of entitlement - boundary markers and title recordation in the case of
real estate; objective manifestations of consent in the case of contracts
- in order to give maximal guidance to those who need to know what
their rights are. 8 7 Thus, in Barnett's view it is not inconsistent with
individual liberty to hold individuals liable whenever they manifest
their consent to an obligation, even if they subjectively intended to
consent to no such thing. According to Barnett, a contrary rule would
be inconsistent with the equal liberty of others, who may need to know
whether the individual is subject to an obligation or not. 88
Thus, an important operational difference between Barnett and
Fried lies in Barnett's willingness to endorse the objective theory of
interpretation as applied to contract law. 89 This frees Barnett from at
least one of the difficulties faced by Fried. Fried believed that any
background rules·pertaining to promissory matters could rest only on
85. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
86. Barnett, supra. note 21, at 297-99. At least, if one asks why individuals should have the
authority to decide whether and when to transfer away their property rights, Barnett's answer is
libertarian: Such a right is the best way of "facilitating freedom of human action .•.. " Id. at
297. If one asks why freedom of action is itself a desirable thing, his answer sounds closer to
economic or utilitarian notions of preference-satisfaction: Liberty is the best way of facilitating
individuals' "pursuit of survival and happiness." Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society:
Part I - Power v. Liberty, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 50, 57 (Summer/Fall 1985). Barnett differs
from most economists, however, in his willingness ~o endorse a particular "vision of the good life
for men," rather than relying solely on empirical observations about what people happen to
prefer. Id. at 71 n.49. Since freedom itself is the only aspect of Barnett's vision of the good life
that he invokes in his writings abput contract law, it seems appropriate to describe his position as
resting ultimately on the value of individual freedom.
87. Barnett, supra note 21, at 301-07.
88. Id. at 305-06.
89. Id. at 300-09; cf. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 61-67 (criticizing the objective theory of
interpretation as inconsistent with individual liberty).
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the value of individual autonomy; he therefore had to exclude large
areas of contract law (e.g., mistake, impracticability, and offer and acceptance) from the promissory sphere, in order to accept. default rules
in those areas which were based on other values. 90 Barnett faces.no
such obstacle to the acceptance of default rules based on other values,
for an "objective" interpretation of any given promise will necessarily
depend on factors other than the promisor's subjective act of will.
However, Barnett still faces the task of figuring out just which values should inform the objective interpretation of any particular action
or agreement. Under Barnett's view of promises as marking consent
to the transfer of property rights, the rules governing each party's obligations can be described by specifying exactly which rights have been
transferred. To use one of Barnett's examples, if a person who agrees
to a sale of a car is best viewed as making an unconditional transfer of
the right to that car, the buyer would be entitled to specific performance if the seller fails to hand over the property. If the seller is instead
viewed as making a conditional transfer of the right to the car or the
right to damag~ for nonperformance, the buyer could not sue for 'specific performance, but only for monetary damages. 91 As Barnett puts
it elsewhere, "[m]ost 'real world' contractual disputes involv.e determining precisely which rights were intended. to be transferred by the
parties."92 While this passage could be read as referring to the actual,
subjective intentions of the parties, his other writing makes it clear
that the only relevant intentions are those indicated by all the objective
markers of consent. 93
Unfortunately, Barnett does not tell us how to decide which rights
we should deem transferred by any particular set of objec~ive indicators. In some cases, he looks solely to existing expectations about the
obligations'normally assumed by parties in similar circumstances. For
example, Barnett would usually resolve the issue discussed in the preceding paragraph in favor of the specific performance remedy, treating
the parties as agreeing to an absolute transfer of rights (unless the contract specifies otherwise). His principal rationale for this result is that
"most people would expect that when the contract is executed [the
buyer] has a right to the specified land or car.'~ 94
90. See supra notes· 79-84 and accompanying text.
· 91. Barnett, supra note 56, at 195-96.
92. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
1969, 1979 (1987).
.
93. Barnett, supra note 21, at 301-07,,
94. Barnett, supra note 56, at 195. But cf. infra note 95. Barnett also argues that his preferred rule would properly place the burden of arguing against specific performance on the guilty
breacher, rather than on the innocent plaintiff. See Barnett, supra note 56, at 182. However,' this
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At other times, Barnett relies on economic arguments about the
efficiency of various rules. For example, he suggests that his presumption in favor of specific performance might be reversed in cases where
specific performance would be extremely difficult for the seller and a
fungibl~ replacement good is easily available to the buyer. 95 On another topic, he argues that an employer who hires an employee but
then dismisses him before the job has even begun should normally be
treated as having assumed responsibility for any reliance losses the employee suffers - for example, if the employee has given up his prior
job or incurred significant moving expenses. Barnett's rationale is a
straightforward economic one: employers usually have better information about the risk that the employee will not be needed, so employers will usually be the better risk bearer. 96 At other times, though,
Barnett seems to view his theory as not requiring any explicit recourse
to economic analysis. For example, he asserts that even if his consent
theory is consistent with the dictates of economic efficiency, it is still
superior because its outcomes can often be determined "without
resorting to an explicit efficiency analysis." 97
Even more troubling, on other occasions Barnett (like Fried) seems
to believe that certain default rules are somehow inherent in the concepts employed by his theory and therefore do not require normative
justification of any sort. As an example, consider Barnett's analysis of
the undisclosed agency problem which arises when an agent A buys
goods from a third party T and turns them over to his undisclosed
principal UP, whereupon UP gives A money to pay T for the goods,
but A becomes insolvent and T never receives his payment. 98 Barnett
concludes that T can sue UP to collect his payment, even though this
will make UP pay twice, once to the now-insolvent A and once to T.
Barnett's argument is that the agency agreement between UP and A
authorized A to transfer to T any of UP's rights. Once A entered into
the purchase agreement with T, then, the transfer to T of UP's ownerargument is clearly incorrect, for we cannot decide whether the seller is guilty of a breach until
after we decide how to interpret the transaction. If the transaction is best interpreted as transfer·
ring the right to the specified good or to its equivalent in monetary damages, there is nothing
"guilty" in the seller paying monetary damages instead of handing over the good.
95. Barnett, supra note 56, at 196 n.59 ("Where these circumstances can be shown to exist•••
it may no longer be safe to presume that sellers would have consented to specific relief."). Barnett would also refuse to allow specific performance in contracts for personal services. See supra
note 64 and accompanying text. But this is because he believes people should not have the
authority to limit their future freedom to this extent.
96. Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 443, 478-80 (1987).
97. Barnett, supra note 92, at 1976.
98. Id. at 1984.
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ship of the purchase price became an accomplished fact, and UP
therefore had no right to resist T's demand for payment. 9 9
While this description of the transaction may be consistent with
the rules of agency law, it in no way justifies or explains those rules.
The problem is that Barnett never justifies his construction of the underlying agency agreement between UP and A, which he reads as empowering A to make an unconditional transfer of UP's rights. At least
as a matter of logic, that agency agreement could equally well be interpreted as giving A the more limited power to make a conditional transfer of UP's rights (conditional on A's not becoming insolvent), thereby
putting the risk of A's insolvency on T rather than on UP. Either
arrangement is perfectly consistent with the principle of giving fair
notice to T, as long as the legal rule is clear in advance so that T
knows the degree of risk he is being asked to assume. To put the same
point slightly differently, either rule would represent a perfectly "objective" interpretation of the agreement. To argue for one rule over
the other, Barnett would have to point to some other reason - efficiency, existing expectations, etc. - to explain why it was better to
put the risk of A's insolvency on UP rather than on T, at least as a
presumptive matter. He would thep. have to explain why the reason he
selected (efficiency, or whatever) was the appropriate principle to look
to in selecting a default rule.
In discussing a more complex problem .of undisclosed agency law,
Barnett does suggest an awareness of some of these difficulties. In a
footnote, he states:
Developing a consent theory's approach to construing contractual intent
when parties are silent on an issue would require a lengthy and separate
treatment. Such an effort would involve, among other topics: (1) a discussion of tacit versus expressed knowledge; (2) the presumption that the
parties intended what most similarly situated parties would have intended ex ante, thus putting the onus on a minority of parties to express
their dissent from the majority by an express term; and (3) the likely
incentive effects of the. principles of construction on the bargaining behavior of other parties. 100

Other topics for discussion could easily be added to this list - for
example, (4) the conditions under which transaction costs make it difficult for parties to vary the default rule by an express term to the
contrary, and (5) the principle that ought to be used to select the default rule in those cases where whatever rule the law selects is_ likely to
99. Id. at 1984-85.
100. Id. at 1986 n.71.
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remain in force for most parties.101
What Barnett does not seem to realize, however, is how little can
be accomplished with respect to the content of the law's background
rules until this "lengthy and separate treatment" has been completed.
Without a theory of interpretation, the only guidance we are left with
in selecting default rules is that the law should take an objective approach to interpretation. But to endorse an objective approach is
merely to identify one factor - the secret, subjective intention of
either party - which should not be used as a reason for preferring one
rule over another. It says nothing about which factors should be considered. It thus leaves unresolved all the debates concerning the role
of efficiency as a goal of contract law, or the extent to which contract
law should be shaped by redistributional concerns or other values.
Barnett may have rejected those values as inadequate explanations for
the binding force of promises, but their role in the selection of default
rules remains completely open.
CONCLUSION

Debates over the question of why promises are binding will no
doubt continue to occupy the attention of philosophers and legal
scholars. Such debates raise issues that are fundamental to western
political thought - issues such as individual freedom versus collective
control, economic efficiency versus non-economic values, or (more
generally) consequentialist systems of ethics versus deontological ones.
Any question that offers such a tempting array of topics will always be
the subject of frequent visits by scholars, and the question of why
promises are binding is no exception.
My thesis is that debates over the question of why promises are
binding do much less than is commonly supposed to settle the role to
be played by efficiency, non-economic values, or ethical theories generally in selecting contract law's background rules. More precisely, I
have argued that certain answers to the question of why promises are
binding do nothing to settle these larger issues. Theories that explain
the binding force of promises by pointing to the value of individual
freedom, or the obligation to tell the truth, may well be valid answers
to the question of why promises are binding. But truth and freedom
can usually be served equally well by any background rule, so some
other value must be introduced to explain why any one rule ought to
be chosen over any other. And when we ask which values ought to be
101. For a discussion of these issues from an economic perspective, see the articles cited
supra in note 3.
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introduced for this purpose, we thereby reopen the entire debate about
the role of efficiency, non-economic values, and other ethical theories.
Even if we have rejected any particular value as an explanation of why
promises are binding in the first place, that does not settle the question
of whether that value can or should be used in selecting a default rule.
In short, much of the current philosophical debate about the binding force of promises is simply irrelevant to contract law's choice of
background rules. Legal philosophers who are interested in the content of contract law should direct their energies to this question, and
not solely to the question of why promises ought to be binding.

